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TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries,
and the Doha "Solution"
Alan 0. Sykes*
Pharmaceutical prices in the developing world have been much in the news
lately. The bulk of the attention stems from the HIV/AIDS epidemic which affects
many developing countries acutely, and where much of the infected population is said
to be unable to obtain effective therapies because of their prohibitive cost. The annual
cost of advanced retroviral therapies in South Africa, where one in eight persons is
thought to be infected, is said to be about $12,000, far beyond the means of most
South Africans.1 Only about 5 percent of the 1 million citizens of Thailand believed
to be infected are able to afford the AIDS therapies prescribed to them.2
Much of the problem is attributed to the prices charged by pharmaceutical
companies for their patented medications. A UN study reports, for example, that 150
mg of the HIV drug fluconazole costs $55 in India, where the drug does not enjoy
patent protection, as compared to $697 in Malaysia, $703 in Indonesia, and $817 in
the Philippines, where the drug is patented. Similarly, the HIV treatment known as
AZT costs $48 per month in India, as compared to $239 in the United States, where
patent protection exists.
Developing nations where patents are in place seek to reduce those prices with
measures that the pharmaceutical manufacturers say would infringe their intellectual
property rights. Some of these initiatives have already brought forth legal challenges.
South Africa was the target of litigation initiated by a number of pharmaceutical
manufacturers over South Africa's Medicines and Related Substances Control Act of
* Frank & Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago, The Law School. My
thanks to Mike Mullican for able research assistance.
1. Judy Rein, International Governance Through Trade Agreements: Patent Protection for Essential Medicines,
21 NwJ Ind L & Bus 379, 400 (2001). See also Frederick Abbott, The TRIPS-Legality of Measures
Taken to Address Public Health Crises: A Synopsis, 2001 Widener L Symposium J 71.
2. Rein, 21 NwJ Ind L & Bus at 400 (cited in note 1).
3. United Nations, Report of the High Commissioner of the Human Rights Commission on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 at 14, para 44 (2001)
("UNCHR Report").
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1997.4 The US government also initiated an action against Brazil within the World
Trade Organization ("WTO") over the compulsory licensing provisions in Brazil's
Industrial Property Law.5
Developing nations subsequently united in an effort to relax (or at least "clarify")
the scope of intellectual property protection required for pharmaceuticals under the
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS" or "Agreement"). Certain developed nations, most prominently the United
States and Switzerland, responded with a campaign to protect their interpretation of
TRIPS against any developments that might undermine it.6 The eventual result was a
ministerial interpretation of the TRIPS agreement in the form of a "Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health," one of the few concrete legal
developments during the recent WTO ministerial meetings in Doha, Qatar ("Doha
Declaration" or "Declaration"). 7 The Declaration gave the developing nations many of
the legal "clarifications" that they were seeking, although a number of issues remain
unresolved.
The precise impact of the Doha Declaration on the policies of developing
nations remains to be seen, but it seems likely that the Declaration will embolden
them to enact measures that will reduce the returns to pharmaceutical patent holders,
at least with respect to drugs that are used to treat certain diseases. Such measures
will likely include the award of compulsory licenses for the production of patented
medications (with minimal royalties payable to the patent holder), and the allowance
of "parallel imports" of medications from nations where prices are lower. This essay
will take a preliminary look at the merits of such policies from an economic
perspective, and draw on this analysis to suggest some directions for the resolution of
legal issues that remain on the table after Doha.
The ultimate wisdom of measures that relax intellectual property protection for
pharmaceuticals in developing countries turns on complex matters, including
empirical issues about which one can only hazard an educated guess. It is conceivable
that patent rights in the developing world have negligible impact on research
incentives. They may simply raise prices on patented drugs, transferring rents to
foreign pharmaceutical patent holders, and creating deadweight losses by pricing
4. Duane Nash, South Africa's Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997, 15 Berkeley
Tech Lj 485,493 (2000).
5. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, U.S. Drops TRIPs Dispute Against
Brazil's Patent Law, in Bridges Between Trade and Sustainable Development, Year 5, No 5 at 5 June
2001).
6. WTO Ministers Likely to Face Dfficult Choice on TRIPS, Public Health, Inside US Trade Special Report
1 (Oct 30, 2001).
7. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO Doc
WT/MIN(01)/DEC//2 (Nov 14, 2001).
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consumers out of the market who are willing to pay the marginal cost of medicines but
not the monopoly markup charged by the patent holder.
But there is another possibility, one which in my view better accords with what
we know about the importance of patents to pharmaceutical research, and with the
extraordinary value to consumers of medicines that successfully treat serious
conditions. Developing nations have long had little intellectual property protection
for pharmaceuticals, and we have concurrently witnessed an apparent dearth of
research into diseases such as malaria and drug-resistant tuberculosis that are of
particular importance to these nations. The lack of patent protection may have
resulted, at least in part, from an acute collective action problem-developing nations
reap the full benefits from lower prices when they do not create pharmaceutical
patents, yet the costs in terms of diminished research incentives are largely
externalized to the rest of the developing world. The WTO TRIPS agreement held
out some promise of overcoming part of this problem. Yet, just as the obligations of
developing nations under TRIPS are beginning to take hold, the Doha Declaration
casts great doubt on the future credibility of patent rights for pharmaceuticals in
developing nations. The result may be quite unfortunate for research incentives,
especially those relating to particular diseases.
Section I provides an overview of the legal issues under TRIPS and the history
of the tensions that they have created. Section II lays out the basic economic issues,
while Section III offers some legal and policy discussion.
I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Prior to the creation of the WTO, which replaced the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") in 1995, national intellectual property laws were largely
unregulated within the GATT system. Certain aspects of intellectual property law
were affected by other multilateral covenants, most importantly the Berne Convention
on copyright, but the details of patent protection in particular were largely left to
national discretion.'
Developed nations, with greater stocks of human capital and higher levels of
educational attainment on average, tend to generate the bulk of new inventions in the
world and have historically maintained the greatest degree of patent protection under
national law. Developing nations, with much less inventive activity within their
borders, typically lack a strong domestic political constituency for patent protection,
and indeed will often benefit from the opportunity to use technology developed and
patented elsewhere without the need to pay royalties. Consequently, patent
protection in developing countries historically has been lax by comparison to the
developed world.
8. John H.Jackson, The World Trading System 310-13 (MIT 2d ed 1997).
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This "North-South" divide on the scope of intellectual property rights was the
source of many heated disputes in years past, with developed nations regularly
accusing the developing world of "piracy." The United States, for example,
unilaterally declared that the failure of foreign governments to protect US intellectual
property rights was an unfair trade practice and could be the subject of retaliatory
sanctions under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, even though no international
agreement had been violated.9 Pursuant to this authority, the United States initiated
a number of unfair trade cases against developing countries for "inadequate"
intellectual property protection, extracting concessions in some instances.'0
The North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), signed in late 1992,
began a trend toward the integration of intellectual property rules into trade
agreements. NAFTA effectively replaced the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement,
which had little to say about intellectual property rights. But when the arrangement
was expanded to encompass Mexico with the creation of NAFTA, Mexico was
required to commit itself to provide intellectual property rights comparable to those in
place in the United States and Canada." NAFTA Chapter 17 thus sets out elaborate
provisions on what each member State must do to protect intellectual property,
including requirements for patent protection in Article 1709.
The Uruguay Round of negotiations under the auspices of GATT was already
underway when NAFTA was signed. The developed members of GATT built on
the NAFTA model and labored to ensure that intellectual property protection would
be included in the results of the Uruguay Round. Resistance from developing
countries was intense, but ultimately they acceded to the inclusion of what is now
known as the WTO TRIPS Agreement.
2
A. PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF TRIPS
The patent requirements of TRIPS are contained in Articles 27-34. Patents
must be made available for all "inventions, whether products or processes,"'3 and must
9. See 19 USC § 2411(d) (2001); 19 USC § 2242 (2001). The history of these statutory provisions is
discussed briefly in John H. Jackson, William J. Davey, and Alan 0. Sykes, Legal Problems of
International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials and Text on the National and International Regulation of
Transnational Economic Relations 818-20,832-35 (West 3d ed 1995).
10. Targets of US action included Brazil, Argentina, India, Thailand, the People's Republic of China,
and the Republic of China (Taiwan). For a history of these disputes and their outcomes, see Alan
0. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for
Section 301, 23 L & Pol in Ind Bus 263, 318 (1992) (a table of disputes is set out in the Appendix).
11. Jackson, Davey, and Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations at 491 (cited in note 9).
12. See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 33 ILM 81 (1994) ('TRIPS").
13. Id at art 27.1.
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last for at least twenty years from the date of the filing of a patent application. 4 The
clear inclusion of process patents within the required scope of coverage was of
particular interest to the pharmaceutical industry. 5  Article 28 provides that the
patent holder must be given the exclusive right to make, use, offer for sale, or sell the
patented product (in the case of a product patent) or the product made from the
patented process (in the case of a process patent). 6 Patent holders also have a
"qualified" exclusive right to import, as discussed below.
Pursuant to various transition provisions, these rules did not have immediate
effect in the developing world. In general, developing nations were permitted to delay
the application of most provisions of the TRIPS agreement for five years after its
entry into force, or until January 1, 2000.17 The least developed countries have until
January 1, 2006 to comply with most TRIPS obligations.' 8  Finally, developing
nations that did not provide patent protection for a particular area of technology
(such as pharmaceuticals) prior to the entry into force of TRIPS have until January 1,
2005 to enforce patent rights in that area'9-this transition rule explains the present
lack of patent protection for pharmaceuticals in India that was noted in the
introduction to this essay. As these transitional exemptions run out, developing
nations must look for generally applicable exceptions to the patent rules of TRIPS if
they are to avoid full patent protection for pharmaceuticals in the future without
violating WTO law.
One candidate for such an exception is TRIPS Article 27.2, which provides:
"Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their
territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public...
including to protect human ... health.., provided that such exclusion is not made
merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law." This confusingly worded
exception might be read to create a general "public health" exception to the
requirement of patentability, but it is not so interpreted. Rather, it is understood to
refer to inventions that are themselves harmful to the ordre public, and that cannot be
14. Id at art 33.
15. New drugs can be covered by patents on their chemical composition (so-called "composition of
matter" patents), or by patents on the process used to make the drug. It is not uncommon for
synthesis of a new pharmaceutical compound to precede its commercial use (or the capacity of a
manufacturer to produce it cheaply) by many years. Accordingly, the patent on an economical
commercial process for making the drug will often remain in force considerably longer than the
initial composition of matter patent. The failure of many developing countries to protect process
patents, and its effect on the pharmaceuticals industry, was a particular concern of the United States
entering the Uruguay Round. Several of the unfair trade cases initiated under Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974 addressed this issue.
16. TRIPS at art 28 (cited in note 12).
17. Id at art 65.2-3.
18. Id at art 66.1.
19. Id at art 65.4.
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exploited under national law' (for example, the United States might deny a patent on
a new type of water pipe designed to enhance the pleasures of opium smoking).
Another exception that on its face might seem to provide some opportunity to
reduce protection for pharmaceuticals is that of Article 30, which states: "Members
may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided
that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner." This exception has been given limited scope in WTO disputes, however, and
it is doubtful that a refusal to patent a particular drug at all or to enforce exclusive
rights to sell during the mandatory period of the patent could be viewed as a 'limited
exception.' ' To my knowledge, developing nations have not suggested that they may
rely on Article 30 to deal with the pharmaceutical issue.
Instead, much of their attention has been directed to Article 31, concerning "use
without authorization of the right holder" or, in more conventional parlance,
compulsory licensing. A "compulsory license" is a license to manufacture the patented
product that is granted over the objection of the patent holder. Domestic laws that
authorize compulsory licensing are permissible under Article 31 but must satisfy a
number of conditions. Among other things, compulsory licensing must be preceded
by an effort over a "reasonable period of time" to negotiate a license from the right
holder on "reasonable commercial terms." Article 31(b) provides that this limitation
may be waived by a Member in the event of a "national emergency." In addition,
under Article 31(o, any such use must be "predominantly for the supply of the
domestic market." Further, "the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration...
taking into account the economic value of the authorization," as provided for by
Article 31(h). These provisions raise a number of interpretive issues. How long must
a Member attempt to negotiate a license from the right holder in the face of apparent
impasse? When does a "national emergency" exist that allows the prior negotiation to
be avoided? What is "adequate remuneration" to the right holder? The developing
nations sought favorable "clarification" on these and related issues at the Doha
ministerial meeting.
20. World Trade Organization, Overview: The TRIPS Agreement 8, available online at
<hrtp://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tripse/intel2_e.htm> (visited Mar 24, 2002).
21. In Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, Article 30 was found to permit governments
to allow the production of a patented drug by competitors before the patent runs out for the
purpose of conducting the clinical trials necessary to secure regulatory approval of a generic
substitute to be introduced upon the expiration of the patent. In the same proceeding. Article 30
was found not to authorize the production of a patented medication during the life of the patent by
competitors who wished to stockpile it for sale as a generic following the expiration of the patent.
World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
WT/DS114/R (Apr 7, 2000), available online at
<htrp://www.wro.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/distabasewto_membersl_e.htm> (visited Mar
24, 2002) (listing panel and appellate body reports by country).
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Another provision that may afford developing nations an opportunity to lower
pharmaceutical prices relates to an important qualification on the exclusive right to
import under Article 27. That article cross-references Article 6 of TRIPS, which
provides that "nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights." This obscurely worded provision concerns
the question of whether a patent holder retains any rights over the resale of a product
once it has been introduced into the stream of commerce, or whether the initial sale by
the right holder "exhausts" its rights. The issue becomes relevant in the following
example. Suppose that a pharmaceutical patent holder sells a drug into country A's
market for $1 per unit. In country B's market, by contrast, the patent holder prefers
to charge $2 per unit. If the patent holder's rights are "exhausted" following the sale in
country A, then the patent holder has no right to prevent buyers in country B from
importing the drug from country A and undercutting the patent holder's desired price
in country B. In that event, the ability of the patent holder to price discriminate
across markets (absent substantial transport costs or important tariff barriers) will be
destroyed. Likewise, developing countries that face relatively high prices for a
particular drug when it is sold directly into its market by a patent holder may be able
to ameliorate the problem by importing the drug from another country where a lower
price is charged. Such imports are termed "parallel imports" in WTO parlance, and
the resolution of the "exhaustion" issue thus determines whether a patent holder has a
legal right to require nations in which it holds a valid patent to prevent parallel
imports.
B. THE PRELUDE TO DOHA AND THE DOHA DECLARATION
The AIDS crisis in the developing world and the financial obstacles to
addressing it have understandably evoked much sympathy, and the developing nations
are not without powerful political allies in the developed world. The litigation
initiated against South Africa by international pharmaceutical companies resulted in a
flurry of unfavorable commentary in the press, and the suit was eventually dropped in
April 2001.' Political considerations also led the United States to drop its WTO
challenge to Brazil's Industrial Property Law, in return for a promise by Brazil to
consult with the United States before invoking its domestic legislation on compulsory
licensing.' The UN Commission on Human Rights weighed in on the matter as
well, arguing that access to drugs is a human right, and that TRIPS should be
interpreted flexibly to promote access to drugs. 4
22. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, U.S. Drops TRIPs Dispute Against
Brazil's Patent Law (cited in note 5).
23. Id.
24. UNCHR Report (cited in note 3).
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Accordingly, the political climate prior to the Doha meeting was favorable to the
objectives of the developing countries, and the resulting Declaration gave them much
of what they sought. It acknowledges the "gravity of the public health problems
afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting
from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics."21 The ministers "agree
that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking
measures to protect public health," and state that the agreement "can and should be
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all."2
With regard to specifics, the Declaration provides 7
(a) In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law,
each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object
and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and
principles.
(b) Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to
determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.
(c) Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency
or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public
health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and
other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency.
(d) The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each Member free to
establish its own reme for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to
[certain limitations related to nondiscrimination].
It should be noted that ministerial declarations within the WTO are not legally
binding in the dispute resolution process, and in the event of a dispute the language of
the treaties as approved by national governments would prevail over any contradictory
declaration by the ministers. But the Doha Declaration is primarily interpretive of
imprecise obligations in TRIPS, and does not appear to contradict any textual
provision. As such, it is likely to be persuasive authority in the interpretation of
TRIPS in the event of a dispute.
It also bears noting that the developing nations did not receive everything on
their "wish list" at Doha. Recall that TRIPS Article 31(f) provides that compulsory
licensing shall be "predominantly for the supply of the domestic market." Developing
nations nevertheless sought language in the ministerial declaration to the effect that
"nothing in the TRIPs Agreement prevents Members from granting compulsory
licenses for foreign suppliers to provide medicines in the domestic market," and
25. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health ar para 1 (cited in
note 7).
26. Id at para 4.
27. Id at para 5.
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"nothing in the TRIPs Agreement will prevent Members to grant compulsory licenses
to supply foreign markets." The importance of this issue is considerable, as some
developing nations lack the technical capacity to manufacture pharmaceuticals
domestically. Thus, if Article 31(f) is interpreted to allow compulsory licenses only
for domestic manufacturers serving the domestic market, the compulsory licensing
option may not be useful in some cases. The Doha Declaration defers resolution of
the issue, stating only that:
We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use
Ofcompulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for
TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General
Council before the end of 2002.'
II. LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
The Doha Declaration opens the door wider to compulsory licensing and
parallel importation of patented pharmaceuticals by developing countries. Subject to
the proviso that countries with little domestic manufacturing capability may have
difficulty taking advantage of compulsory licensing, and depending on the ultimate
legal standard for "adequate remuneration" under Article 31 of TRIPS, developing
nations may well have gained considerable leeway to undercut the rents that patent
holders could otherwise earn from the sale of patented medications in the developing
world. Indeed, the mere threat to invoke rights of compulsory licensing and parallel
importation may suffice to extract much of those rents in the form of lower prices
from patent holders. The extent to which developing nations will avail themselves of
such policies remains to be seen, but this section explores their wisdom.
I begin with some questions that a Socratic teacher might ask. Imagine a
developing nation with a severe housing crisis, a famine, or an extraordinary natural
disaster. It believes itself to have a desperate need for funds as a result, and asserts
that it cannot obtain the needed funds through general taxation or available aid
programs. Would we then think it appropriate for the nation in question to
expropriate the property of foreign corporations (say, their mineral rights and
manufacturing facilities), and to auction it off to raise needed funds? Or would we
think it appropriate for the nation simply to repudiate its external public debt, leaving
foreign lending institutions as the parties implicitly "expropriated?" If not, how would
we distinguish measures that "expropriate" the rents otherwise due to pharmaceutical
patent holders in the face of public health crises?
28. Developing Countries Push for TRIPS to Allow Cheaper Medicines, 19:25 Inside US Trade 7 (June 22,
2001).
29. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health at para 6 (cited in
note 7).
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The most obvious response is that a property right cannot be "expropriated"
unless it exists in the first instance. If the TRIPS Agreement affords developing
countries the right to respond to public health emergencies through compulsory
licensing and the right to allow parallel imports on a non-discriminatory basis, the
argument would run, these policies are readily distinguishable from my hypothetical
on the grounds that they do no violence to the legitimate entitlement of the right
holder.
This argument is at least partially unsatisfactory on the issue of compulsory
licensing (not on parallel importation, however, given Article 6 of TRIPS). The
apparent position of the developing nations and their supporters is that they can now
declare a "national emergency" at their sole discretion on grounds of a public health
problem, and thereafter issue compulsory licenses for production to serve their
domestic markets without prior negotiation and with minimal royalties payable to the
patent holder. One may argue forcefully that such a construction of TRIPS would
indeed do considerable violence to the rights that pharmaceutical patent holders
thought they had under the Agreement. Article 31 of TRIPS seemingly limits
compulsory licensing without prior negotiation to genuinely extreme circumstances,
and even then ensures "adequate remuneration" to the compulsory licensor. It is
difficult to square its text with the proposition that developing countries can
unilaterally determine that they are unable to afford pharmaceuticals at current prices,
declare that a "national emergency" results, and then implement policies that leave
patent holders with rents near zero.
Indeed, note that the term "national emergency' in TRIPS is in no way limited
to public health issues, and that compulsory licensing under Article 31 is in no way
limited to pharmaceutical patents. Thus, return again to my hypothetical regarding a
housing crisis, famine, or natural disaster that creates a great need for funds. Would
we think it permissible for a developing nation confronting such problems to suspend
foreigners' patent rights by issuing compulsory licenses that allow domestic firms to
produce the patented goods and sell them at marginal cost, with the government then
imposing a tax on those sales to raise needed revenue? If not, how is that situation to
be distinguished from suspending the rights of foreign pharmaceutical patent holders
in the face of a public health crisis? And can one seriously doubt that violence is done
to what patent holders thought they were achieving with the TRIPS Agreement if
developing nations can declare a "national emergency' when they need funds for some
legitimate end, and tax away the rents of foreigu patent holders to raise revenue?
Even if TRIPS affords developing countries enough flexibility to distinguish
their plans for compulsory licensing and parallel importation from my hypothetical
case of expropriation as a legal matter, however, it remains to inquire whether policies
that eliminate the rents of pharmaceutical patent holders in response to public health
"emergencies" are wise. To those issues we now turn.
c 01 3 WO. 1
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A. THE MONOPOLY/INNOVATION TRADEOFF AND ITS GENERAL
IMPLICATIONS
Patent rights allow inventors and their licensees to prevent potential competitors
from selling products covered by the patent during its duration (now twenty years). If
a product has no close substitutes and there are significant numbers of consumers
willing to pay more than the cost of production to acquire the product, the patent
holder will then enjoy a period of significant "monopoly power' during the life of the
patent, defined as an ability to elevate price above cost.
Ordinarily, public policy is hostile to monopoly. In economic parlance, it is a
source of "deadweight losses." Monopolists charge more for goods and services than
the cost of producing them, thereby pricing consumers willing to pay cost but not the
full monopoly price out of the market. Monopolists' loss of "consumer surplus"
represents the standard deadweight loss triangle in price theoretic discussions of the
evils of monopoly.' In addition, monopolists may invest resources in obtaining
monopoly, thereby dissipating monopoly profits ex ante and causing further
deadweight losses. With patents in particular, monopoly rents may be dissipated by
excessive investment in the race to develop a new invention-a so-called patent race."
Depending on the degree of monopoly power enjoyed by a patent holder,
therefore, the existence of a patent may cause significant deadweight losses. The
justification for tolerating them, of course, is that they provide a desirable return to
inventors. Invention is costly, runs the argument, and if inventions can be copied and
sold by competitors of the inventor immediately, their prices will be driven down to
the marginal cost of producing them exclusive of the cost of innovation. As a result,
inventors will be unable to recoup research and development costs. Knowing that fact
ex ante, potential inventors will be unwilling to incur such costs and technical progress
will be stifled. Patent rights overcome this problem by affording the patent holder a
period of monopoly rents that allows the recoupment of research and development
costs. The magnitude of the rents to inventors under a patent system is reasonably
correlated with the value of an invention-monopoly rents will be greater the lesser
the extent to which close substitutes for the patented good exist, and the greater the
degree to which consumers value it in excess of its cost.
Although the theoretical rationale for a patent system is easily stated, the proper
calibration of a patent system is not. Patent systems traditionally provide a fixed term
of patent, regardless of the type of invention or the costs of innovation that need to be
recouped. It thus will tend to over-reward some inventions (relative to what is
necessary to induce them) and to under-reward others. Yet, the information
30. Frederic M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 14-19 (Rand McNally 2d
ed 1980).
31. Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 394-99 (MIT 1988).
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necessary to refine the system is not easy to come by-after all, what matters to the
pace of research and development are its expected returns ex ante, and those are
exceedingly difficult to observe. At best, therefore, modern patent systems provide a
crude way of rewarding inventors in the face of great uncertainty about the optimal
rewards in each case.
This observation provides a window into a possible line of argument that might
distinguish the "expropriation" of rents owing to patent holders from the
expropriation of other property. The standard argument for property rights in
general is that they create proper incentives for exploitation of resources. No one will
bother to cultivate the land, for example, if they cannot lay claim to the crops that they
produce. But if one had reason to believe that the patent protection afforded in a
particular context was excessive, such a "property right" could not be defended as
important to valuable incentives. Quite the contrary, it could become
counterproductive, imposing unnecessary deadweight costs of monopoly, and perhaps
inducing further waste through ancillary patent races in pursuit of patent monopolies.
The overall evidence on the economic efficiency of the patent system, however, is
mixed. Although critics at times suggest that patent protection is excessive, and
others find it inadequate, there is surely no consensus on the matter as a general
proposition. It is possible that a general curtailment of patent rights might do little
harm or even do some good, but no one really knows. Further, legislatures around the
world have for centuries confronted the essential monopoly/innovation tradeoff of the
patent system, and have collectively settled on a twenty-year patent as a system that
apparently is thought to strike a sensible balance. It simply cannot be argued,
therefore, that patent rights are excessive as a general proposition (more on the special
case of pharmaceuticals below).
B. PATENTS AND DEVELOPING NATIONS
Just as theory alone cannot tell us what constitutes an optimal patent system in
any detail, economic theory suggests that the effect on global economic welfare (by which
I mean the sum of the welfare effects on all nations) of an agreement requiring
developing countries to afford patent protection is ambiguous. It is possible that
geographically broader patent protection will induce innovation at a rate that more
than offsets the additional monopoly losses, but it is also possible that it will have the
reverse effect.32
If one focuses not on global economic welfare but on the economic welfare of
developing countries, by contrast, conventional wisdom holds that the extension of
patent protection to developing countries is harmful. This proposition is based on the
32. Alan Deardorff, Should Patent Protection Be Extended to All Developing Countries?, in Robert Stern, ed,
The Multilateral Trading System: Analysis and Options for Change 435 (Michigan 1993).
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empirical premise that most innovations occur in developed nations, so that patent
rights will result in a large transfer of rents from developing countries to developed
ones. Although some larger developing nations (perhaps those in the "newly
industrialized" category) may have enough domestic inventive activity to profit from
patent protection," smaller and less developed economies are likely to be net losers.
Some commentators have argued on this basis that the least developed countries
should be exempt from intellectual property obligations,7 and, as noted, TRIPS
allows them until 2006 to implement their commitments.
Can one fashion an argument from the fact that developing nations as a whole
may suffer a welfare reduction as result of TRIPS for relaxing the iitellectual
property protections of TRIPS in particular settings, such as pharmaceuticals? The
answer would seem to be no, at least from an economic standpoint.
Developing countries in the main were initially hostile to the TRIPS Agreement
when it was proposed during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, a position
that was not surprising given the received wisdom that they would collectively suffer
under TRIPS. They nevertheless accepted TRIPS in the end, for reasons that have
been summarized by Professor Bhagwati: (i) developing countries sought concessions
on other matters (such as textiles and agriculture), and believed that the business
community in the developed world would not support a package containing these
concessions without TRIPS; (ii) developing countries anticipated that in the absence
of an intellectual property agreement, large nations such as the United States would
take unilateral trade measures anyway to "punish" nations that did not protect US
intellectual property rights; (iii) some developing countries anticipated that
intellectual property protection would attract valuable foreign investment and
technology transfer; and (iv) some larger developing countries (such as India)
recognized that they were significant creators of intellectual property and would reap
benefits from the growth of their creative industries." In short, developing countries
accepted the commitments of TRIPS because it was in their mutual interest when
coupled with the concessions that they received on other issues. If parties deviate
from their commitments after the fact, the value of their commitments is diminished
in the future. Trade agreements will become less valuable to signatories, and fewer of
them will be entered, if commitments are not kept. This observation argues for
adherence to the bargain after the fact.
33. Ishac Diwan and Dani Rodrik, Patents, Appropriate Technology, and North-South Trade, 30 J Ind Econ
27 (1991).
34. Alan Deardorff, Should Patent Protection Be Extended to All Developing Countries? at 446 (cited in note
32); Keith E. Maskus and Denise Eby Konan, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights: Issues and
Exploratory Results, in Alan Deardorff and Robert Stem, eds, Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the
Global Trading System 401, 440 (Michigan 1994).
35. Jagdish Bhagwati, Comment on Services and Intellectual Property Rights, in Susan Collins and Barry
Bosworth, ecls, The New GATT Implications for the United States 111, 112-114 (Brookings 1994).
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Of course, to say that developing countries should respect their commitments
under TRIPS begs the question of what those commitments are. This point brings
us full circle to the issues discussed earlier, and makes the impact of TRIPS on the
welfare of developing countries into an entirely irrelevant consideration. The
economic case for encouraging nations to respect their commitments under trade
agreements has no quarrel with behavior that is consistent with those commitments.
But to the extent that what developing countries propose to do with pharmaceutical
patents is in tension with their TRIPS commitments, deviation comes at the cost of
undermining the credibility of their commitments, now and in the future. The fact
that the commitment from which a nation seeks to deviate imposes a loss on that
nation is of no moment, for that is always the case when a nation seeks to deviate.
The quid pro quo for compliance with such commitments is the equivalent behavior
by other parties, which ensures a reciprocal balance of exchange that yields net
benefits to all.
C. PATENTS ON PHARMACEUTICALS AND "ESSENTIAL MEDICINES"
The case for protecting the rents of patent holders is particularly strong in the
pharmaceutical sector. Even though the rents earned on pharmaceutical patents in
developing countries are in general a modest fraction of global patent rents, they may
be vital to the incentive for research and development in certain key areas as explained
below.
Pharmaceuticals are unusual in the extent to which research and development
("R&D") and regulatory approval costs are a large part of their total production cost.
Indeed, the marginal cost of producing pharmaceuticals is often trivial after a drug has
been developed and approved by regulators. 6 R&D and regulatory approval costs are
incurred in the main by the company that develops a drug initially-subsequent
producers of the same drug face much lower costs (although costs of obtaining
approval for a generic version of a drug are not trivial). Without some period of
restricted competition, the developers of new drugs will be unable to recoup R&D and
regulatory approval costs, and the incentive to develop new drugs will diminish
greatly.
For this reason, conventional wisdom has it that patent protection is especially
important to the rate of technical progress in pharmaceuticals. In one survey by
Professor Mansfield, executives in a range of industries were asked to estimate what
percentage of inventions commercialized in the early 1980s would not have been
developed without patent protection. The average response for all industries was only
36. David Meltzer, Commentary on "Health Insurance and the Growth in Pharmaceutical Expenditures" by
Patricia M. Danzon and Mark V. Pauly, J L & Econ (forthcoming 2002).
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14 percent, but for pharmaceuticals the average was 60 percent.' Studies that
examine the rate of return on pharmaceutical research also underscore the importance
of patent protection for recoupment of R&D costs-they show how many R&D
expenditures fail to produce valuable new drugs, and how the funding of
pharmaceutical research as a whole requires substantial rents on the modest subset of
products that prove particularly successful.' Patents are essential in this regard.
Indeed, some researchers question whether the patent protection available widely
in the developed world is sufficient to induce all desirable research. Professors
Murphy and Topel have studied the social returns to pharmaceutical research by
estimating global consumers' willingness to pay for new drugs. In the case of drugs
that address serious diseases affecting a large number of people, they find consumer
willingness to pay to be staggeringly high, due to the combined effect of the
importance of health to consumers generally, and the fact that the world has five
billion of those potential healthcare consumers. Hence, they argue that research
projects with even a tiny probability of success are socially worthwhile when they
address serious health conditions, yet they find that far too little research seems to be
undertaken. The reason, they conjecture, likely relates to the difficulty of
appropriating the returns to innovation. 9
Despite the apparent importance of patent protection to pharmaceutical R&D,
some commentators have been critical of the effort to extend pharmaceutical patent
protection to developing countries. Professor Scherer offers such a skeptical view
based on a variant of the general argument considered earlier regarding the welfare
effect of patents on developing countries. Scherer notes that the gross domestic
product ("GDP") of the developing countries is only about one-fifth that of the
developed countries, and infers from that fact that patent rights in developing
countries could generate only about 20 percent or so of the available global rents. He
then concludes that losses to developing countries from the transfer of monopoly
rents from developing nations to developed nations as a result of patents are likely to
exceed by a wide margin any benefits to developing countries from the new drugs that
result from broader patent protection.4
Scherer's argument is less than fully convincing for two reasons. First, given the
apparent value of pharmaceutical research and the importance of patent protection to
inducing it, the case for global patent protection in the pharmaceutical industry is
37. Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 Management Sci 173, 175 (1986).
38. See, for example, Martin Neil Baily, Research and Development Costs and Returns: The U.S.
Pharmaceutical Industry, 80 J Pol Econ 70 (1972); Henry Grabowski and John Vernon, Returns to
R&D on New Drug Introductions in the 1980s, 13 J Health Econ 383 (1994); Frederic M. Scherer,
Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pbarmaceutical Industry, 7J Econ Perspec 97 (1993).
39. See Kevin Murphy & Robert Topel, The Economic Value of Medical Research, J L & Econ
(forthcoming 2002).
40. Frederic M. Scherer, Industry Structure, Strategy and Public Policy 362-66 (Harper Collins 1996).
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stronger than it is in most other industries. Even if Professor Scherer were right
about the welfare impact of pharmaceutical patents on developing countries viewed in
isolation, the odds that such patents will nevertheless enhance global welfare appear
particularly favorable in this sector. Second, and perhaps more important, it is a
mistake to assume that because developing nations are only about 20 percent of global
GDP, they in turn represent only about 20 percent of global willingness to pay for
pharmaceuticals (and are thus a potential source of only about 20 percent of the total
possible rents). The reason is that the incidence of disease is not uniform around the
globe. As noted in the introduction, a high percentage of the individuals infected with
HIV are located in developing countries. And as the Doha Declaration itself
acknowledges, diseases such as malaria and drug resistant tuberculosis are "epidemic"
in developing nations. They are a relatively minor health concern, by contrast
(nonexistent in the case of malaria), in developed countries. It follows that the
economic incentive to do research on such diseases will depend critically on the ability
of pharmaceutical companies to earn rents on sales in the developing world.
Incentives to do research on tropical diseases generally have been weak in the
past, as groups such as Doctors Without Borders have observed.4 Patent protection
under TRIPS can ameliorate such problems. Yet, just as the transition periods for
developing countries to implement their TRIPS obligations are expiring, the Doha
Declaration holds out the prospect of compulsory licensing and parallel importation
policies that may eviscerate the rents that patent holders might otherwise hope to earn
on new drugs that address diseases of disproportionate concern to developing
countries.
Does the analysis change if we label a drug "essential," or if a disease is
"epidemic"-can one argue for an exception to general principles on the basis of such
classifications? From an economic standpoint the answer must be no. Drugs that
treat serious and widespread conditions are precisely the drugs that are the most
valuable to society, and thus the types of drugs on which more research and
development has the greatest potential payoff. A policy that requires the developers of
such drugs to sacrifice their intellectual property rents in the name of a "national
emergency" or some similar moniker will simply discourage research in the areas
where it has the most potential to yield high returns.
41. Doctors Without Borders, Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines: Target Diseases-Tuberculosis,
available online at <http://www.accessmed-msf.org/campaign/tbOl.shtm> (visited Mar 24, 2002)
(describing lack of research on tuberculosis); Doctors Without Borders, Campaign for Access to
Essential Medicines: Target Diseases-Malaria, available online at <http://www.accessmed-
msf.org/campaign/mlrOl.shtm> (visited Mar 24, 2002) (describing ongoing lack of research on
malaria). See also Obijiofor Aginam, From the Core to the Peripheries: Multilateral Governance of Malaria
in a Multi-Cultural World, 3 ChiJ Intl L 87 (2002).
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D. PARALLEL IMPORTS AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Recall that parallel imports occur when a drug sold by a patent holder in one
country is exported by a buyer to another country where the patent holder's price for
the drug is higher. Plainly, the effect of parallel importation is to undercut the ability
of the patent holder to engage in price discrimination across national markets. A
higher price in one market will attract parallel imports (if they are legal) whenever
transportation costs and tariffs into the higher-priced market add up to less than the
price differential.
Absent parallel imports, pharmaceutical patent holders will often find price
discrimination attractive. In general, it pays to charge a different price across two
markets if the elasticity of demand in those markets differs at a common price. The
market with the low elasticity of demand-that is, where price can be raised without
causing a lot of consumers to exit the market-will be charged the higher price. The
high elasticity market-where a price increase causes a larger loss of consumers-will
receive the lower price.42
Demand elasticity for pharmaceuticals will routinely differ across national
markets. One reason relates to differences in the availability of substitutes because of
regulation-where regulators have approved dose substitutes for a drug, demand
elasticity will be higher than where they have not. Government price regulation of
pharmaceuticals also plainly affects demand elasticity (there are no customers above
the maximum allowed price, absent a black market). Differences in income across
countries are another important source of differences in demand elasticity.
Consumers in higher income countries will typically be willing to pay more for drugs
than consumers in lower income countries. This last observation might be thought to
imply that parallel imports are more likely to flow into developed nations than
developing nations, but it is important to recognize that great differences exist in
incomes (and income distributions) across the developing world as well.
Economists have long known that price discrimination may or may not
exacerbate the deadweight losses associated with monopolies as a theoretical matter.
The conventional empirical wisdom, however, is that price discrimination tends to
produce an expansion of output to serve consumers who would be priced out of the
market by a non-discriminating monopolist. If so, fewer consumers who are willing to
pay the marginal cost of producing the monopolized good will be priced out of the
market, and deadweight losses will fall.43 One fact that is beyond dispute, however, is
that price discrimination raises the profits of monopolists-a monopolist can always
42. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance at 316 (cited in note 30).
43. Id at 320-21. A possible offsetting factor is that price discrimination makes monopoly more
profitable, and thus more resources may be expended by companies in pursuit of a monopoly
position.
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choose not to discriminate, and thus any observed price discrimination is
presumptively more profitable than charging a single price everywhere.
These observations suggest some immediate objections to policies that permit
parallel imports of pharmaceuticals.' Parallel importation invariably reduces the rents
that are earned by pharmaceutical patent holders. To the degree that those rents are
important to inducing worthwhile R&D investments, as suggested above, this effect is
unfortunate. Parallel imports may also exacerbate the deadweight costs of monopoly
by forcing patent holders to abandon price discrimination and revert to policies
approaching those of a non-discriminating monopolist, curtailing global output in the
process.
The last point suggests why parallel importation may have especially harmful
consequences for some developing countries. If trading nations as a whole ban parallel
imports, pharmaceutical patent holders should be willing to sell their products at a
low price to nations where customers cannot afford to pay much for them as long as
that price covers the marginal cost of making the drug and delivering it. They will be
willing to do so because each sale yields some profit, and they need not fear that their
low-priced sales in one market will be re-exported to undercut their prices elsewhere.
When parallel imports are possible, by contrast, they will likely become unwilling to
sell at low prices in markets where demand is weak. Poorer countries may then find
themselves largely priced out of the market for particular medications.
Not only may opportunities for parallel imports reduce valuable R&D, increase
the deadweight costs of monopoly, and harm the poorest countries, they may also
create a "free rider" problem in nations where pharmaceutical distributors perform
valuable and expensive services. Imagine a distributor who undertakes costly
measures to inform physicians about the value of a particular drug or to secure needed
regulatory approvals, for example, and who must recoup the costs of doing so through
the price that it charges for the drug. Parallel imports of the drug from abroad where
distributors do not incur such costs may make it impossible for distributors who
provide valuable services to recoup their costs. Parallel imports in this situation may
be said to free ride on the services of the local distributor.
To be sure, parallel imports are not simply a potential problem in developing
nations, and their costs may well be more severe when allowed into developed
markets. But to the extent that the Doha Declaration encourages them in the
developing world, some harm will surely be done.
44. For a more extensive survey of the issues, see Claude Barfield and Mark Groombridge, Parallel Trade
in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and Health Policy, 10
Fordham Intel Prop, Media, & Enter L J 185 (1999). See also Keith Maskus and Mohamed
Lahouel, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries, in Bernard Hoekman
and Will Martin, eds, Developing Countries and the WTO: A Pro-Active Agenda 233, 243-45 (Blackwell
2001); Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy 208-16 (Institute for
International Economics 2000).
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E. THE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM
The need for more research and development on health problems that are
particularly acute in the developing world has already been noted*5 It is sometimes
asserted that research on these health problems is lacking because developing
countries are poor, and hence pharmaceutical companies do not expect to make
enough selling new drugs to recoup their investments in research.
The profit motive is undoubtedly a vital consideration in the R&D decisions of
pharmaceutical companies. But one cannot simply presume that the lack of research
is because comparatively low GDP per capita in developing countries makes profitable
drug research infeasible. When willingness to pay for effective drug therapies is
aggregated across countries containing hundreds of millions if not billions of people,
the total profit potential can be substantial. This is all the more true when the
governments of developing countries become actively involved in financing drug
46treatments.
It is thus likely that the dearth of research is attributable in significant part to
heretofore weak intellectual property protection for pharmaceuticals in developing
countries. Many developing countries have had no patent protection for
pharmaceuticals at all, and in others it has been quite limited (such as an absence of
process patents). Further, where patent protection has existed, it historically has been
a matter of national (not international) law and could thus be changed at any time
without international penalties.
Such a situation has all the elements of a classic collective action problem (or, if
you prefer, "prisoner's dilemma"). If credible patent protection across the developing
world would stimulate valuable research that was in the collective interest of
developing nations, each individual nation is nevertheless a relatively modest fraction
of the collective market. Thus, each nation may be tempted not to afford patent
protection, secure in the knowledge that it will reap the full benefits of lower domestic
drug prices as a result, while its policy will have only modest impact on global research
incentives. Put differently, each nation will reap all the benefits from a decision not to
afford patent protection, while the costs will be borne by developing countries as a
whole. With full internalization of the benefits and substantial externalization of the
costs, the equilibrium behavior would likely be under-protection of patents, even if
stronger protection were in the interests of developing nations as a group.
The TRIPS Agreement has the potential to change this situation dramatically.
Once the transition periods for developing countries expire, all WTO members will
45. See note 41. See also Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A
Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 ChiJ Ind L 27 (2002).
46. See Mary Ann Torres, The Human Right to Health, National Courts, and Access to HIV/AIDS
Treatment: A Case Study from Venezuela, 3 ChiJ Ind L 105 (2002).
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be required to afford full patent rights on pharmaceuticals (although it would allow
them to permit parallel imports). The requirement is backed by standard WTO
sanctions for non-compliance. Thus, after the transition, TRIPS is, in principle, a
vehicle for overcoming at least part of the collective action problem.
However, the Doha Declaration does much to undermine its effectiveness in this
regard. Any pharmaceutical company contemplating research on diseases of particular
interest to developing nations is now on notice that in the event a successful new drug
is developed, developing country customers may declare a "national emergency" and
thereafter award compulsory licenses without prior negotiation, and at a royalty rate
that may be minimal depending on the eventual interpretation of the "adequate
remuneration" standard in Article 31.' Even if such behavior is not in the collective
interest of developing nations, the temptation to engage in it on an individual country
basis may be great because the costs to others are externalized.
Additionally, it bears noting that Article 6 of TRIPS (which effectively allows
nations to choose whether or not to allow parallel imports on an individual basis)
creates its own collective action problem. Even if parallel importation is not in the
interests of developing countries as a whole for the reasons given earlier, a decision by
a single nation to permit such imports will produce lower prices that benefit it directly
while the costs will be borne mainly by others.'
III. LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This analysis has highlighted the worrisome possible consequences of policies
that erode the returns to pharmaceutical patents in developing countries. I stipulate
that the severity of these consequences is an empirical question on which more
research might usefully be done, and thus any conclusions here are necessarily
tentative.
One implication of the discussion here is that other policy instruments should be
considered before patent rights are eroded. One alternative policy instrument, of
course, is public funding of medical therapies at current prices by the governments of
developing nations. Although many such governments will argue that they cannot
"afford" to do so, a claim which may often be persuasive, certainly not every developing
nation is altogether unable to provide funds for public health.
47. It is of no moment whether the compulsory license is actually issued, or whether the threat to issue
one is enough to induce the patent holder to slash its prices. Either way, rents on the patent are
largely forfeited.
48. The problem under Article 6 may be less severe, however, because of the requirement that the policy
toward parallel imports be non-discriminatory (in other words, applicable to all patented products,
nor just pharmaceuticals). A nation tempted to allow parallel imports on pharmaceuticals may face
constraints with respect to other products (a desire to attract technology transfer in other areas, for
example) that may discourage it from allowing parallel imports of everything.
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Where this source of funding is unrealistically small, another obvious policy is
aid from developed nations. Indeed, the recent G-8 summit in Genoa announced
such a program, committing $1.3 billion in new economic aid to assist developing
nations in fighting AIDS4 9  Given the wide set of tax instruments available to
developed nations to raise general revenues, it is certainly plausible that aid programs
will cause fewer economic distortions than an implicit tax on the rents of
pharmaceutical patent holders."
Whatever the merits of greater reliance on governmental assistance to people in
need of medicines in developing countries, however, existing sources of such aid are
widely perceived to fall short of what is needed to enable developing countries to meet
their public health needs."' If developing countries are to address their problems some
other way, what can one say about the second- or perhaps third-best options?
An important implication of the above analysis is that international price
discrimination by pharmaceutical patent holders may well be a useful practice. It
increases the returns to patent holders and enhances research incentives, while
allowing patent holders to price their medicines in a way that makes them affordable
to poorer countries. Article 6 of TRIPS can stand in the way of successful price
discrimination by authorizing nations to declare that the first sale of a patented
product "exhausts" the rights of the patent holder, thereby allowing buyers to resell
the product to undercut higher prices elsewhere. One might therefore consider
possible changes to Article 6. Among other things, it is hardly clear that the
exhaustion issue should be resolved the same way for all products, and that the
nondiscrimination rule of Article 6 is desirable. One can imagine changes to TRIPS
that would permit sectoral agreements on the exhaustion issue, followed by a
particularized agreement discouraging parallel imports of pharmaceuticals.
Amendments to WTO agreements are not easily achieved, however, and the political
prospects for any such changes at the present juncture are quite another matter.
One can also imagine practices that would better facilitate price discrimination
within developing countries. Governments might commit themselves to eschew
compulsory licensing or parallel imports, for example, in exchange for discounted sales
of medicines to be administered to its poorest citizens and not to be resold to citizens
who can afford the medicines at the usual price. Such programs have the twin
benefits of making medicines more affordable to the poor while increasing patent
49. See Developing Countries Face Five Billion Dollar AIDS Drugs Bill, Agence France Presse (Oct 6, 2001).
50. Such reasoning is common in thinking about tax policy. Taxes typically cause some economic
distortion, and if one broadens the set of tax instruments available to raise any target level of
revenue, one can typically (though not always) find combinations of instruments that reduce the
total distortion.
51. Developing Countries Face Five Billion Dollar AIDS Drugs Bill, Agence France Presse (cited in note 49).
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holders rents and research incentives. The prospects for such arrangements may also
be dim, however, in part because of the collective action issues elaborated above.
The other options for protecting the rents of patent holders involve limitations
on compulsory licensing, which could be achieved by interpretive means within the
WTO dispute resolution mechanism. One possibility, notwithstanding the Doha
Declaration (which, again, does not have binding legal force in a WTO dispute), is to
construe the concept of "national emergency' narrowly, thereby insisting that nations
ordinarily negotiate at some length with patent holders before invoking compulsory
licensing with an eye toward agreement on "reasonable commercial terms." The
importance of the right to negotiate will turn in large part on the interpretation of this
last phrase, but it can certainly be argued that "reasonable commercial terms" for a
patent license would include a substantial royalty to the inventor if the invention has
great economic value.
Another lever over compulsory licensing is Article 31's requirement of "adequate
remuneration" to the patent holder, which must be paid even in cases of "national
emergency." That provision has not yet been interpreted, but it can again be argued
that remuneration is not "adequate" if it fails to take account of R&D costs, not only
for the successful drug in question but also for unsuccessful research aimed at the
same medical problem. Cash-strapped developing nations might be permitted to
spread payments out over time in a sensible fashion under this standard, as long as the
present value of the payment stream represented a reasonable return on R&D
expenditures.
I conclude by reiterating that these suggestions are tentative, and by
underscoring the value of empirical research that might shed further light on these
difficult issues. My goal here is not to resolve the policy issues definitively, but merely
to suggest that the Doha Declaration may be moving the global community in the
wrong direction. Public health crises in the developing world understandably evoke
great sympathy, and the political support for relieving financial pressures at Doha was
readily understandable. However, as the economist Alan Blinder has reminded us,
these difficult humanitarian issues must be approached with both a soft heart and a
hard head.52 A lack of credible patent rights for pharmaceuticals in the developing
world may do far more harm in the long run than their absence can accomplish in the
short run.
52. Alan Blinder, Hard Heads, Soft Hearts: Tough Minded Economics for a Just Society (Addison-Wesley
1989).
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